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THE REGULATION OF OUTDOOR ADVERTISING: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
John T. Lucking* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Misplaced outdoor advertising billboards have long been a famil-
iar eyesore. When placed in predominantly residential or scenic 
zones, they mar horizons and fill green spaces with intrusive com-
mercial messages which invade our privacy and insult our sensibili-
ties. Although their purpose is to further the economic well-being 
of local businesses, they may paradoxically contribute to its demise 
by making an area unattractive to those consumers capable of living 
or going elsewhere. I Outdoor advertising must therefore be strictly 
regulated in order to enhance the overall aesthetic and economic 
welfare of the community. 
Outdoor advertising cannot be condemned entirely. It has been 
part of the commercial scene since the days of ancient Greece when 
panel-covered columns listed the order of contests at public games. 2 
Outdoor displays serve as a low cost3 means of providing the desired 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
I The following testimony, given by a local town meeting member before a state board 
empowered to regulate outdoor advertising, typifies the increased awareness in local com-
munities that they have the right and often the responsibility to demand an aesthetically 
pleasing environment: "Communities can no longer neglect the total living spaces. We cannot 
run away from our homes, nor do we want to. We cannot escape our obligation to strike down 
ugliness as we would strike down noise in order to protect the viability of our communi-
ties .... " Brief for Appellant app., at 80-81, John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising 
Bd., Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975). 
2 INSTITUTE FOR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, THE FIRST MEDIUM 2 (1975). 
3 Outdoor advertising is less costly than any other medium. Interview with William 
McBain, Legal Counsel for John Donnelly & Sons, Inc., in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 26, 1976). 
Outdoor advertising (billboards) costs $20.00 per adult rating point as compared with $47.00 
for radio; $42.00 for television; $76.00 for newspaper; and $100.00 for magazines. INSTITUTE 
FOR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, THE FIRST MEDIUM 20 (1975), quoting MEDIA MARKET GUIDE (Sum-
mer 1975). 
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information needed to induce purchases in the marketplace. Thus, 
it is neither economically desirable nor aesthetically necessary to 
eliminate outdoor advertising from predominantly commercial, 
nonresidential areas. 
Since the beginning of the century an increasing number of bill-
board and sign regulatory laws have been enacted at all levels of 
government. Most of these regulations have been based partially or 
totally upon aesthetics. At the local and state level, these regula-
tions have been upheld under the states' police power to preserve 
the health, safety, and general welfare. 4 State regulation has usually 
taken the form of enabling legislation which empowers communities 
to enact their own outdoor advertising ordinances.5 Sometimes the 
state sets limits on the municipalities or retains review power.6 How-
ever, in recent years some local ordinances have gone beyond regula-
tion to complete prohibition of billboards.7 Two states have virtually 
prohibited commercial outdoor advertising. s The courts have up-
held these prohibitions under the states' police power.s 
Outdoor advertisers, when confronted with aesthetically based 
regulations, often claim that legislatures should not be vested with 
the power to declare what is aesthetically pleasing because they 
cannot define their choices by objective standards. Thus many early 
court decisions employed legal fictions to disguise a fear that aes-
thetic evaluations may be a matter of individual taste, and thus too 
subjective to be applied in any but an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. to 
j See, e.g., John Donnelly & Sons v, Outdoor Advertising Bd" Mass, Adv, Sh, 3450, 339 
N,E.2d 709 (1975). Police powers are those broad powers reserved to the states which have 
not been specifically granted to the federal government by the Constitution. They are exer-
cised to preserve and further the public health, safety, and welfare, even at the expense of 
private rights. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
, E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93 §29 (1972). The power to create state-wide anti-sign 
enabling legislation, often expressed in the state constitution, must be delegated because of 
an absence of inherent police power in municipal corporations. E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS 550 (3d ed. 1969). See, e.g., Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 135, 297 P. 1037 (1931). 
, See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-18-2, 5-18-3 (1956); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93 §§ 29-31 
(West 1972). 
7 E.g., BROOKLINE, MASS., SIGN-Bv-LAW, art. XXIII as amended (1972). 
, HAW. REV. STAT. §445-112 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 481-505 (1973). The prohibi-
tion in these two states refers to off-premise signs and not on-premise signs. See text at notes 
82,87-116, infra. 
B E.B. Elliot Advertising Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 805 (1970); Tysco Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'r, 12 F. Supp. 202 (S.D. 
Tex. 1935); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). 
'" [Ajuthorities in general agree as to the essentials of a public health program while 
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However, many recent decisions have established that the legisla-
tive function includes determining that the community should be 
aesthetically pleasing}1 Even some state constitutions explicitly 
empower their legislative assemblies to preserve the right of the 
people to an aesthetically pleasing environment. 12 The judiciary 
may intervene only when such legislation is unreasonable or arbi-
trary, that is when it is insufficiently related to the general welfare. 13 
The problem in trying to define the undefinable is not one new 
to the law. The problems in defining what is ugly or obtrusive are 
in some ways analogous to those in defining what is obscene or 
immoral. In the latter, the Supreme Court has allowed legislative 
determination of community standards so long as the statutory reg-
ulation is constitutionally specific and thus not overbroad or 
vague. 14 As Justice Douglas pointed out in Berman u. Parker, 15 the 
legislature should also be empowered to determine that the com-
munity should be beautiful as well as safe, despite the difficulty in 
defining beauty. Sometimes the undefinable must be defined in 
order to ensure, as Chief Justice Warren stated, the "right of the 
Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society .... "16 The 
community or society determines what is "decent" for itself and this 
must be reflected through representative legislatures. 
In 1965, the federal government also began to regulate outdoor 
advertising through the Highway Beautification Act. 17 The Act pro-
poses to preserve natural beauty and promote safety on the nation's 
federally funded highways by controlling outdoor advertising in 
areas adjacent to those highways. Implementation of the Act, how-
ever, is left to the states,18 most of which have enacted legislation 
the public view as to what is necessary for aesthetic progress greatly varies. . . . Succes-
sive city councils might never agree as to what the public needs from an aesthetic stand-
point, and this fact makes the aesthetic standard entirely impractical as a standard for 
use restriction upon property. The world would be at a continual seesaw if aesthetic 
considerations were permitted to govern the use of the police power .... 
City of Youngstown v. Kahan Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925). 
11 See text at note 33, infra. 
12 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 5; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLIX (Mass. 1918, 
amended 1972). 
13 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). 
" Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
" 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). See also text at note 32, infra; Ely, Legislative and Administrative 
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1235-49 (1970); Crumplar, Architectural 
Controls: Aesthetic Regulation of the Urban Environment, 6 URBAN LAWYER 622, 634 (1974). 
" Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,199 (1964)(Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
17 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 135-36, 319 (Supp. V 1975). 
" In order to ensure state cooperation, the federal government will impose a ten percent 
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prohibiting outdoor advertising in areas near the interstate system. IO 
This article is primarily concerned with off-premise sign ordi-
nances at the state and local level which go significantly beyond the 
federal act; that is, which affect vistas well beyond federally funded 
highways.2o Those arguments most frequently raised for and against 
these ordinances will be outlined and traced through their evolu-
tion. Finally, legislation will be suggested which could improve the 
present situation. 
II. AESTHETICS AND THE GENERAL WELFARE 
Justification for any regulatory ordinance or statute must be 
found in some aspect of the state police power. 21 If the ordinance has 
no relation to the health, safety, or general welfare, it may be chal-
lenged as an arbitrary, unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional 
taking of private property in violation of the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.22 
The long debated issue in outdoor advertising regulation is 
whether the often undefinable concept of the general welfare antici-
pates legislation to promote an aesthetically pleasing environment. 
The courts, as will be shown, initially defined the concept in a 
limited way but eventually broadened their interpretation to in-
clude aesthetic regulation. 
A. Use of Legal Fiction as a Justification for Aesthetic Regulation 
The courts were initially reluctant to recognize aesthetics as a 
valid police power objective.23 They were willing to consider aesthet-
ics as one permissible factor behind billboard and architectural con-
trols, but hesitated to accept them as the sole rationale for such 
controls. Courts often went to almost comic lengths to find tradi-
tional police power objectives with which they could rationalize 
reduction in federal aid highway funds to those states which have failed to control the signs. 
[d. § 13I(b). See Cunningham, Billboard Control Under The Highway Beautification Act of 
1965, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1295 (1973). 
" See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200 et seq. (West Supp. 1977). 
20 On-premise signs, those meant to identify the business on the premises, have tradition-
ally been subject to different regulation than off-premise product or service advertisement 
signs. See text at notes 79-85, infra. 
21 See note 9, supra. 
22 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
23 E.g., Wolverine Sign Works v. Bloomfield Hills, 279 Mich. 205, 208, 271 N.W. 823, 825 
(1937). 
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such controls.24 The use of legal fictions enabled the courts to avoid 
the real issue: whether these ordinances could be justified on aes-
thetic grounds alone. 
Welch v. Swasey25 exemplifies this evasive approach, in the Su-
preme Court's treatment of a city ordinance limiting the height of 
buildings in certain residential historic districts. The Court strained 
to include the ordinance, enacted primarily for aesthetic reasons, 
within the notion of protecting public safety-a traditional police 
power objective. 
This Court is not familiar with the actual facts, but it may be that in 
this limited commercial area the high buildings are generally of fireproof 
construction .... And there may be in the residential part (where the 
height restriction applies) more wooden buildings, the fire apparatus 
may be more widely scattered .... 26 
However, in dictum the Court previewed things to come by admit-
ting that an aesthetic rationale for the ordinance would not invali-
date it.27 
The courts gradually became more willing to accept aesthetics as 
partial justification for a sign ordinance. For example, in 1935, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a regulation pro-
hibiting billboards near highways where, in the opinion of the au-
thorities, "having regard to the health and safety of the public, the 
danger of fire and the unusual scenic beauty of the territory, signs 
would be particularly harmful to the public welfare .... "28 Many 
courts, in fact, still cling to an "aesthetics plus justification" ap-
proach.29 In many of the "aesthetics plus justification" rulings, the 
courts had latitude to apply other police power objectives. Never-
theless, in many instances the courts used ostensible police power 
objectives to avoid and obscure the ultimate issue of whether aes-
thetics alone are a valid police power goal. 
" One court expanded the public safety notion by cautioning that criminals can commit 
crimes behind billboards. St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99,137 
S.W. 929 (1911). Traditional police power objectives include, e.g., the preservation of historic 
areas, New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953), and promotion of public safety, 
General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 
(1935). 
" 214 U.S. 91 (1909). 
" [d. at 107 (emphasis added). 
27 [d. at 108. 
2K General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 164, 193 
N.E. 799, 806 (1935) (emphasis added). 
" See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 828 (1973). 
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B. Aesthetics as a Sole Welfare Objective 
In 1954, the Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker30 calmed judicial 
anxieties over unlimited aesthetic discretion by defining the general 
welfare in terms of changing public values: "The concept of the 
public welfare is broad and inclusive ... the values it represents are 
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is 
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community 
should be beautiful as well as healthy. . . . "31 
Not until the last decade, however, did state courts begin to ac-
cept aesthetics as a permissible sole rationale for zoning ordi-
nances.32 Now the validity of a restriction rests solely upon whether 
the method of achieving an attractive, prosperous community is 
rational and not arbitrary and not upon whether the objectives are 
primarily aesthetic. 33 
In Cromwell v. Ferrier,34 for example, the New York Court of 
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of a local ordinance which to-
tally prohibited off-premise signs in the community on the basis of 
aesthetic considerations alone. The court noted that "[a]dvertising 
signs and billboards, if misplaced, often are egregious examples of 
ugliness, distraction and deterioration. They are just as much sub-
ject to reasonable controls, including prohibition, as enterprises 
which emit offensive noises, odors and debris .... "35 The court 
emphasized that signs may be detrimental to the general welfare if 
they are not significantly related to the economic, social, and cul-
tural patterns of the particular district.38 Although the holding in 
Cromwell was sound as applied to its facts, ugliness should not be 
restricted to those areas economically, socially, and culturally 
"deserving" of beauty. Citizens living in the less affluent, more 
urban communities are also entitled to protection from visual pollu-
tion. 
In 1975, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts discussed 
the equal treatment issue in a decision perhaps the most significant 
to-date in confirming the trend towards acceptance of aesthetic reg-
30 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
31 [d. at 33 (citations omitted); see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,6 (1974). 
32 E.g., Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965). 
33 [d. at 49, 400 P.2d at 262 . 
.. 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749,279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). See also E.B. Elliott Advertising 
Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 805 
(1970). 
35 Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263,272,225 N.E.2d 749,755,279 N.Y.S.2d 22,31 (1967). 
"" [d. 
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ulation of outdoor advertising. John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor 
Advertising Board37 shunned the use of legal fiction and directly 
confronted the issue of regulation for aesthetic purposes. The case 
merits special attention for its comprehensiveness and its probable 
precedential impact. In Donnelly, a municipality amended its sign 
by-law to prohibit any advertising sign or device, including off-
premise signs and non-accessory signs in any residential, industrial, 
or business zone.38 The amendment, in effect, prohibited all bill-
boards within the town. Donnelly, involving judicial review of an 
administrative decision, upheld the by-law and thus denied the 
plaintiff, a large billboard advertiser, the right to maintain its signs 
in the town. 
The court, in validating the ordinance, announced that aesthetics 
alone may justify the exercise of the police power. To reach this 
result it used a two step reasoning process. First, the court noted 
that the ordinance would be unconstitutional only if, according to 
the federal due process test of Euclid v. Ambler Realty CO.39 it had 
no reasonable relation to the public health, safety, or general wel-
fare. Second, the court held that the test for reasonableness is not 
very strict, that the ordinance enjoys a presumption of validity, and 
that the outcome is not to be determined by the court's own opinion 
on the issue. 
The by-law is to be presumed valid and, if its reasonableness is fairly 
debatable, the judgment of the local legislative body must be sustained. 
Due regard is to be accorded to the expression of the residents of the 
town, whom we must presume are familiar with the locality and its 
needs. 40 
The Donnelly court counseled that the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion established the state policy that the people have a right to "the 
natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic qualities of their environment 
• • • ,"41 and that the Massachusetts Zoning Enabling Act42 pro-
vided that regulations shall be designed to "preserve and increase 
37 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975). 
3M BROOKLINE, MASS., SIGN·By·LAw, art. XXIII, § 4 as amended (1972). 
" 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) . 
•• Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450,3464,339 N.E. 2d 709, 716 (1975)(citations omitted). The language 
used here is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's in Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105·06 
(1909). 
" MASS. CONST. amend. art. XLIX (Mass. 1918, amended 1972) . 
.. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A,§3 (1968)(repealed 1975) (amended by 1975 Mass. Acts 
ch. 808, §3). Secton 2A of the amended Act provides that "said [zoning] regulations may 
include ... the development of the ... aesthetic qualities of the community." 
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... [the] amenities" within a city or town. The court then harmo-
nized this legislative notion of the general welfare with judicial pre-
cedent. 43 Donnelly properly concluded that the trend is to recognize 
aesthetics as a permissible sole police power objective. Further, the 
court noted that the statutory inclusion of aesthetic ideals offers "a 
strong indication that citizens ... consider visual pollution, includ-
ing billboards, to be a detriment to the general welfare, "44 demon-
strating that the judiciary is not acting as a subjective evaluator of 
beauty. Thus Donnelly may have dulled the anxieties of courts 
which fear that "aesthetic evaluations are a matter of individual 
taste and are thus too subjective to be applied in any but an arbi-
trary and capricious manner."45 Donnelly is particularly applicable 
in jurisdictions which have written aesthetic goals into their statute 
books. 
Prior to Donnelly, most cases which upheld ordinances prohibit-
ing all billboards involved towns which were primarily residential. 
Total prohibition was upheld, for example, in Raritan, New Jersey, 
an exclusively residential community of 6000 persons,48 and in 
Walkill, New York, a residential area with a population of 1000.47 
On the other hand, the community involved in Donnelly was 
densely populated with a business district occupying nearly a 
quarter of the total area.48 
The trend toward recognizing aesthetics as an independently suf-
ficient police power objective has not been unanimous, however. In 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Des Plaines,49 an Illinois intermediate 
court invalidated an ordinance based solely on aesthetics which 
prohibited off-premise signs but allowed on-premise signs. In 
Combined Communications Corp. v. City of Denver, 50 a court struck 
down an outdoor advertising ordinance on the grounds that totally 
prohibiting an entire industry in the county was unreasonable. 
However, these cases should offer little precedential significance. 
Metromedia ignored the prior case law in other jurisdictions, while 
Combined Communications ignored the real issue: whether a city 
.. See cases cited in notes 32, 34, and 35, supra. 
" Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 3469, 339 N.E.2d 709,718 (1975) . 
.. [d. at 3465,339 N.E.2d at 716 . 
.. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952). 
" Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y. 2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749,279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967) . 
.. Brief for Appellant app., at 69, 71, John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975) . 
.. 26 Ill. App. 2d 942, 326 N.E.2d 59 (1975). 
50 524 P.2d 79, 82 (Colo. 1974). 
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in the exercise of its police power can prohibit off-premise billboards 
for aesthetic reasons.51 
Most challenged sign ordinances have been those creating restric-
tions in commercial districts because the general aesthetic welfare 
rationale appears less applicable in commercial districts than in 
residential zones. 52 Signs are a creation of the commercial sector and 
have always been a fundamental part of it. Perhaps the most contro-
versial part of Donnelly is the court's finding that not only rural but 
also urban communities should have the benefit of aesthetic police 
power protection.53 The opinion counsels that densely populated 
areas are often not distinctly residential or commercial, but both.54 
People who live in mixed urban-residential areas should have the 
same right to live in an aesthetically pleasing environment as those 
who live in more distinctly residential areas.55 On this theory 
Donnelly completely erased any distinction between residential and 
commercial districts, stating that "city-wide prohibition of bill-
boards can also be justified on the grounds that a community has a 
legitimate interest in improving the aesthetic quality of its business 
districts, as well as its residential districts."58 
Residents living in residential-commercial areas certainly deserve 
.. Combined Communications Corp. v. City of Denver, 542 P.2d 79,84 (Colo. 1975)(Kelley, 
J., dissenting). The following view of a New Jersey court signifies a more logical approach 
for the Colorado Supreme Court to have taken: 
Those who live in an urban megalopolis are no strangers to the jungle of signs which daily 
compete for their attention. Undoubtedly, some signs by virtue of their design are more 
aesthetically pleasing than others, regardless of size. But a municipality may perceive that 
a plethora of signs of a certain size, no matter how tasteful, can have an undesirable 
cumulative effect upon the well-being of the entire community. Is the citizenry then 
powerless to deal with this problem when it beholds the fruits of a philosophy of 
noninterference? We think not. In such a situation, assuming the municipality acts rea-
sonably and fairly in the process of balancing the various interests, the right of the 
businessman to promote his goods may become subservient to the community's interest 
in its appearance. . . . 
Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 544, 324 A.2d 113, 122 
(1974) (emphasis added). See Note, Municipal Corporations, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 754 (1976). 
52 E.g., John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 339 N .E.2d 
709 (1975) . 
.. [d. at 3474, 339 N.E.2d at 719 . 
.. [d. at 3475, 339 N.E.2d at 720. 
5. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state 
shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws. A refusal to uphold an aesthetically 
based ordinance in an urban, residential community might constitute a violation of this 
amendment if at the same time a similar ordinance was upheld in a more suburban, residen-
tial community . 
.. John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 3475, 339 
N.E.2d 709, 720 (1975). 
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the same protection afforded to those living in more distinctly resi-
dential zones. Yet, the notion that an extensively commercial or 
industrial area will be made more attractive by the absence of bill-
boards is open to debate. Since the issue is debatable, however, the 
modern judicial presumption in favor of legislation57 required the 
Donnelly court to uphold the ordinance as a rational means of en-
forcing the legislative purpose of preserving aesthetics. 
Although a community must necessarily have a right to improve 
the aesthetic quality of its business zone, a local legislative assem-
bly may not be justified in assuming that the elimination of outdoor 
advertising will achieve this objective. The local legislature in 
Donnelly illustrated that reasonableness is not necessarily wisdom. 
It failed to balance sufficiently the needs of the residential com-
munity with those of business. This failure stems from a lack of 
investigation into community standards of aesthetics and the bene-
fits of outdoor advertising.58 
Anti-sign ordinances originally appeared in residential communi-
ties, where people regarded billboards as most obnoxious when 
erected close to their homes. To these individuals the aesthetic det-
riment far outweighed the signs' communicative value and seemed 
an intrusion of privacy.59 On the other hand, in purely commercial 
areas, outdoor advertising plays a significant role. Its long-lived 
success illustrates its effectiveness as a low cost means of communi-
cation. In a predominantly commercial zone, the billboard thrusts 
its message at an audience willing and eager to participate in the 
marketplace. Yet a broadly drawn ordinance could conceivably pro-
hibit outdoor advertising in Times Square. Such areas flourish with 
commercial hustle and bustle, caused in part by outdoor advertising 
displays. 
Although a city might decide that it is more likely to attract 
commercial enterprises if it enhances its appearance,60 economic 
57 [d. at 3476,339 N.E.2d at 720; Breard v. Alexandra, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
5. In a survey conducted in 1969 to assess human reaction to roadside environment, only 
30% of a random group of individuals favored outlawing billboards entirely. Herrmann, 
Human Response to Visual Environments in Urban Areas, in OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 57, 63 
(J. Houck ed. 1969). In a series of tests which measured response to the change in the physical 
environment caused by removal of billboards, only 32.4% of that same group noticed any 
change in the commercial zone. [d. at 71. 
51 See text at notes 75-77 infra . 
• 0 In re Mid-State Advertising v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 89, 8 N.E.2d 286,289 (1937), quoted 
in John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Board, Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 3476, 339 N.E. 
2d 709, 720 (1975). 
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welfare depends on a flow of information about goods and services. 
No community will be in favor of an ordinance which will hurt the 
economic well-being of local business. The local legislature in 
Donnelly neglected its duty to weigh these considerations before 
determining that a prohibition of billboards in a commercial zone 
would benefit the general welfare. A more cautious legislative ap-
proach might be to narrow the distinction between commercial and 
residential districts rather than to eliminate it completely. Follow-
ing this approach, a total off-premise prohibition in a predomi-
nantly commercial district would not be enacted if legitimate busi-
ness interests had been balanced against those of nonexistent or 
minority private residences. 
How much support the reasoning of Donnelly will receive in other 
jurisdictions remains to be seen. The opinion, in any event, should 
add impetus to the trend of protecting aesthetic values as a valid 
sole police power objective to promote the general welfare. Donnelly 
is clearly the most progressive opinion to-date dealing with restric-
tion of outdoor advertising. 
III. BILLBOARDS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Outdoor advertisers often argue that regulatory sign ordinances 
infringe upon their right of free speech guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. The constitutional issue presented is whether First 
Amendment protection should be afforded to purely commercial 
speech. The First Amendment protects many forms of communica-
tion of a noncommercial nature, but before 1975, it was not consid-
ered protective against government restraint of purely commercial 
speech.81 The S,,-preme Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen82 empha-
sized this distinction in denying an advertiser's attempt to gain 
constitutional protection for his commercial handbill by placing a 
noncommercial political message on its back, in order to evade the 
effect of a prohibitory ordinance. The Court upheld the ordinance, 
reasoning that the advertiser's practice, if permitted under color of 
the First Amendment, would allow every merchant to "append a 
civil appeal, or a moral platitude to achieve immunity from the 
" Breard v. Alexandria, 314 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1951); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-
02 (D.C.Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). 
" 316 U.S. 52 (1942). On one side of the handbill was commercial advertising while the 
other side contained a protest against the action of the City of New York for refusing to allow 
plaintiff the use of city facilities. 
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law's command."63 
The outdoor advertisers were encouraged in 1975, when the Su-
preme Court distinguished Valentine in Bigelow v. Virginia64 and 
announced that advertising was entitled to some constitutional pro-
tection. The Court in Bigelow pointed out that "[t]he relationship 
of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not 
make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas. "85 Bigelow does not, 
however, denounce all regulation of commercial speech.86 The Court 
emphasized the special nature of the type of speech, a newspaper 
advertisement for out of state abortions: "The advertisement pub-
lished in appellant's newspaper did more than simply propose a 
commercial transaction. It contained factual material of clear 
'public interest'. . . . "67 The holding of Bigelow narrowed the First 
Amendment protection of commercial messages to only those of 
"public interest." The issue then became the very difficult one of 
determining what messages were in the public interest. 
This problem, however, lasted only until the decision in Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. 88 The 
Supreme Court held in Board of Pharmacy that the advertising of 
prescription drug prices, although commercial speech, was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.69 The Court all but rejected the 
"public interest" requirement for the constitutional protection, not-
ing that "society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of 
commercial information. Even an individual advertisement, al-
though entirely commercial, may be of general public interest."7o 
The Court thus afforded constitutional protection to almost all com-
mercial advertising by expanding "public interest" to include the 
" [d. at 55. Notice how much noncommercial advertising a typical outdoor advertising 
company displays. "Donnelly's general manager and vice president testified that at anyone 
time 3-5% of its space is donated to public service advertising." John Donnelly & Sons v. 
Outdoor Advertising Bd., Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 3451, 339 N.E.2d 709, 711 n.2 (1975). 
" 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
" [d. at 826 . 
.. [d. 
" [d. at 822. For a discussion of commercial speech and the First Amendment before 1976 
see Comment, Recent Developments-Constitutional Law, 42 TENN. L. REv. 573 (1975). 
" 425 U.S. 748 (1976) . 
.. [d. at 761-73. The Court posed the question as follows: 
Our question is whether speech which does no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion ... is so removed from any exposition of ideas, ... and from truth, science, morality 
and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Govern-
ment ... that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it does not. 
[d. at 1826 (citations omitted). 
70 [d. at 764. 
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right to have product or service information. 
Although the First Amendment interest of outdoor advertisers 
now justifies constitutional protection, it still competes with an-
other significant governmental interest, that of promoting the com-
munity's general welfare by providing a safe and visually pleasing 
environment. The Supreme Court has declared: "The preferred pos-
ition of freedom of speech in a society that cherishes liberty for all 
does not require legislators to be insensible to claims by citizens to 
comfort and convenience. To enforce freedom of speech in disregard 
of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself."71 
Board of Pharmacy thus did not render government powerless to 
regulate particular kinds of intrusive advertising. Advertising might 
still be restricted in time, place, and manner provided that the 
restrictions "are justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental inter-
est, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels 
for communication of the information."72 The ultimate issue be-
comes whether aesthetics alone affects the general welfare suffi-
ciently in a given case to be a permissible police power objective. 
Board of Pharmacy did not improve the outdoor advertising in-
dustry's First Amendment position because it still must prove that 
the commercial interest outweighs the governmental interest in pro-
viding an aesthetically pleasing environment. The only significant 
restriction that Board of Pharmacy placed on an aesthetically con-
cerned legislature was that regardless of the compelling nature of its 
interest, an alternative medium for the advertising message must 
remain available. In light of today's varied network of communica-
tion channels, few problems should follow most bans of off-premise 
billboard messages. Board of Pharmacy had the welcome effect of 
relieving the courts of the difficult task of deciding which advertise-
ments were in the public interest. Billboard regulation already in-
71 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). A recent Massachusetts opinion articulated 
the test as follows: "First Amendment freedoms may be constitutionally abridged if the 
governmental regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest and 'if 
the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that interest. '" Opinion of the Justices, 363 Mass. 909, 916, 298 N .E.2d 
829,834 (1973), quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also Markham 
Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405,439 P.2d 248 (1968). 
72 Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 
(1976) (emphasis added). But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) 
and Comment, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: The War on Neighborhood Deteriora-
tion Leaves First Amendment Casualty, 6 ENV. AFF. 101 (1977). 
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volves a difficult aesthetic value judgment; to have added a public 
interest value judgment would have forced the courts to balance two 
elusive intangibles. Advertisers and the public can be more certain 
of the law if such judicial discretion is minimized. 
Although John Donnelly & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Board 
was decided before Board of Pharmacy it is unlikely that the latter 
would have materially changed treatment of the First Amendment 
issue in Donnelly. Donnelly previews Board of Pharmacy by an-
nouncing that a "[s]tate or municipality may protect individual 
privacy by enacting reasonable time, place, and manner regulations 
applicable to all speech irrespective of content."73 Also, as Board of 
Pharmacy requires, other channels of communication were open to 
the billboard clients of the Donnelly plaintiff. The Donnelly court 
instructed that "there are degrees of protection accorded speech 
and, depending on the circumstances, a State may legitimately reg-
ulate or even prohibit advertising if the First Amendment interest 
is outweighed by the governmental interest .... "74 The protection 
granted purely commercial speech in Board of Pharmacy probably 
would not have outweighed the governmental interest in providing 
an aesthetically pleasing environment before the Donnelly court. 
Donnelly held further that regardless of the extent to which con-
stitutional protection is afforded commercial advertising, no person 
can be compelled to listen against his will.75 This cardinal rule was 
exemplified by Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Lehman v. 
City of Shaker Heights,76 which sustained a municipality's prohibi-
tion of political advertisements and allowance of nonpolitical adver-
tisements on its buses. Douglas reasoned that the degree of captivity 
and resulting invasion of privacy is significantly greater for a pas-
senger on a bus than for a pedestrian on the street and that the 
Constitution grants no right to force a message upon a captive audi-
ence.77 Whether or not billboards are equally as privacy invasive as 
advertising on buses is debatable. 
73 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3450, 3481, 339 N.E.2d 709, 722 (1975), quoting Erznoznik v. Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). 
,. [d. at 3478, 339 N.E.2d at 721. 
75 [d. at 3480, 339 N.E.2d at 722. See also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 
(1975); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 828 (1975). 
7ft 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The issue was whether the City of Shaker Heights obligated itself 
to accept all advertising on its buses by creating a "public forum." The Court held that no 
public forum had been established and that the decision to limit advertising to nonpolitical 
messages was discretionary. 
77 [d. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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IV. THE ON -PREMISE DISTINCTION 
The courts have always distinguished off-premise and on-premise 
signs as distinct categories, subject to different regulation. 7s The 
favored status of on-premise signs derives from their special func-
tion of identifying the products or services offered at the site.79 Al-
though outdoor advertisers often claim that off-premise billboard 
ordinances based upon aesthetics are discriminatory because on-
premise signs may be equally ugly,SO the unique nature of outdoor 
advertising and the nuisances created by off-premise billboards jus-
tify the separate classification of these structures for the purposes 
of governmental regulation.81 
The off-premise advertising sign is not maintainable as a matter 
of right and may even be prohibited altogether, but the authority 
to conduct a business in a particular zoning district inherently car-
ries with it the right to maintain an on-premise business sign subject 
to reasonable regulation.82 Since the on-premise sign is allowed as a 
matter of right it may be reasonably regulated, but may not be 
prohibited. What constitutes reasonable regulation is uncertain but 
the courts have usually upheld on-premise regulatory ordinances 
regarding size and location on the basis of the special characteristics 
of the locale, traditional police power objectives, and more recently 
on the basis of aesthetics. S3 
" United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 150,93 A.2d 362,365 (1952). 
" See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §445-112(4) (1968). Note that billboards are rarely used as 
on-premise signs, which are often an integral part of the building. 
'" See, e.g., United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan 11 N.J. 144, 150,93 A.2d 362, 
365 (1952). 
" See id.; Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529 (1917); Landau 
Advertising Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 387 Pa. 552, 558, 128 A.2d 559, 562 (1957). The 
separate classification of on-premise and off-premise signs creates no invidious discrimination 
and thereby does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, 
e.g., Town of Boothbay v. National Advertising Co., 347 A.2d 419,423 (Me. 1975); National 
Advertising Co. v. Cooley, 126 Vt. 263, 267, 227 A.2d 406, 408 (1967). 
" United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J.144, 150,93 A.2d 362, 365 (1952). 
This is a private property right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. To prohibit on-
premise signs would prevent easy customer access to the business and would unconstitu-
tionally deprive the business of the use of its property, thus constituting an uncompensated 
taking. 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.5 [2] (3d ed. 1976). 
". The use of such [on-premise] signs for advertising purposes is often done with little 
regard for their natural or man-made environment. Their garishness often intrudes on a 
citizen's visual senses. Property owners do have the right to put their property to profitable 
use. But, we do not think that the right to advertise a business is such that a businessman 
may appropriate common airspace and destroy common vistas. Nor do we believe that 
the right to advertise a business means the right to interfere with the landscape and the 
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The courts have applied much the same reasoning to on-premise 
sign regulation as they have in the off-premise sign decisions. 84 The 
only difference in treatment between the categories is that total 
prohibition of on-premise signs cannot be constitutionally achieved. 
In light of Board of Pharmacy, a prohibition of on-premise signs 
would also violate the First Amendment by denying the only avail-
able channel of communication to one trying to identify, rather than 
merely to advertise his business. 
An aesthetically based ordinance regulating on-premise signs 
would be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable if it discriminated be-
tween signs causing the same aesthetic evil. For example, regulating 
size on the basis of square footage alone would be discriminatory. 
Such a regulation would exempt aesthetically offensive signs of 
equal peripheral measurement but fewer square feet (e.g., large, 
single standing letters). It would also be discriminatory to make dis-
tinctions between different types of on-premise signs, for example, 
by exempting roof signs.85 So, too, if an ordinance regulates off-
premise signs on the basis of aesthetics, it should also regulate on-
premise signs to a degree short of prohibition to fulfill the purpose 
of the statute. No private interest in huge, garish on-premise signs 
should outweigh the governmental interest in providing for an aes-
thetically pleasing and safe environment. For a sign ordinance to be 
effective in enhancing the general welfare it must regulate both 
categories of signs according to community standards, although not 
necessarily to the same extent in light of the stronger property right 
inherent in the on-premise category. 
The problem with representative governments' promoting public 
aesthetic ideals does not lie in the legislators' capacity to recognize 
views along public thoroughfares. 
Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 54,199 N.W.2d 525,529 (1972). 
" Unfortunately, many of the on-premise decisions also apply the same discriminatory 
reasoning by upholding regulations on the basis of the urban-rural distinction rather than on 
community standards of aesthetics. People v. Goodman, 31 N .Y.2d 262, 266, 290 N .E.2d 139, 
142, 338 N.Y.S.2d 97, 101 (1972), upheld the ordinance of a community which banned all 
commercial signs greater than four square feet. The court reasoned that the regulation, 
premised upon aesthetics, would be upheld because it bore "substantially upon the economic, 
social and cultural patterns of the community or district [a scenic resort community)." 
Again a court concluded that only those areas where beauty is expected should remain 
beautiful and those areas where ugliness is commonplace should remain ugly. See note' 36, 
supra, and accompanying text. On-premise signs should be as small as deemed by community 
standards within constitutional bounds, see note 83, supra, and not as small as dictated by 
prior history and natural beauty of the surroundings. 
" See City of Sarasota v. Sunad, Inc., 181 So.2d 11, 14 (Fla. 1965). Such reasoning is 
applicable to off-premise sign regulations as well. 
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community ideals, but in their willingness to implement and en-
force them despite pressure from special interest groups. The out-
door advertising industry musters a formidable lobby, while aes-
thetically motivated groups usually lack the legal and financial re-
sources to influence legislation. 
V. MODEL STATEWIDE REGULATION 
Most states delegate to local communities the authority to regu-
late outdoor advertising for off-highway areas,88 and statewide sign 
legislation is typically limited to the borders of the interstate high-
way systemY However, Hawaii and Vermont have passed unusual 
statutes which effectively eliminate off-premise private advertising 
within those states.88 Examination of these statutes will be useful 
to suggest what form future legislation might take. 
The economies of Hawaii and Vermont depend on the tourist 
trade attracted in substantial part by the abundance of natural 
beauty found within their borders. It is because of the strong 
connection between their economic and environmental well-being 
that such statutes were enacted in the two states.89 
Hawaii's statute is not limited to billboards, but generally pro-
scribes any outdoor "symbol" which draws the attention of persons 
in any public place. 90 The effect of the statute is to prohibit the 
erection or display of any outdoor advertising with certain excep-
tions which include: postings of official public notices;91 announce-
ments of meetings displayed on the premises;92 on-premise business 
identification signs;93 on-premise signs advertising services or prop-
erty offered on the premises;94 advertisements carried by people or 
" See note 4, supra, and accompanying text. 
" Statutes enacted to comply with the federal Highway Beautification Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 
131(a) et seq. (Supp. v 1975), include, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-2231-2234 (1972); WYo. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-110-124 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 410.220-410 (1975). A few states 
have statewide size and spacing regulations for on and off-premise signs; however, these 
regulations apply only to certain districts. E.g., to signs visible from state highways, OR. REv. 
STAT. §§ 377.735(3), 377.745, 377.755 (1975); to signs in business zones, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
68-2234 (1972). 
" HAW. REV. STAT. § 445-112 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 481 et seq. (Supp. 1976). 
" See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 482 (1973) for legislative findings. 
'" HAW. REV. STAT. § 445-111 (1968). 
" Id. § 445-112(1). 
" Id. § 445-112(2). 
'" Id. § 445-112(3) . 
.. Id. § 445-112(4). 
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by vehicle;95 signs warning of danger;96 noncommercial signs adver-
tising places of natural beauty, history, or culture;97 political cam-
paign signs near the time of an election;98 and signs on public build-
ings announcing cultural or educational events within the state.99 
Enforcement of the statute is by civil suit for injunctive relief 
brought on behalf of the state by the attorney general, the county, 
or by the owner or tenant of any land, building, or apartment from 
which the outdoor advertisement is visible. loo 
Vermont's statute, on the other hand, not only limits outdoor 
advertising but also provides alternative means of publicizing the 
same information without significantly detracting from the natural 
beauty of the state. The statute brought off-premise advertising 
under the exclusive distribution and control of the state, replacing 
indiscriminate private outdoor advertising with state provided 
guidebooks, official information centers, and official "business 
directional signS."101 Such signs are designed,I02 erected, and main-
tained by state authorities l03 to indicate to the travelling public the 
route and the distance to public accommodations, commercial serv-
ices, and places of scenic, historic, cultural, religious, and educa-
tional interest. IO( All lawful businesses and points of interest are 
eligible for these signs l05 and if such signs are too numerous at a 
" [d. § 445-112(7). 
" [d. § 445-112(8). 
" [d. § 445-112(9). 
OM [d. § 445-112(11). 
" [d. § 445-112(0). 
110 [d. § 445-120. 
'0' VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 483 (1973). Other states have adopted similar legislation to 
apply to their highways subject to the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. §§ 
131(a) et seq. (Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., the Oregon Motorist Information Act, OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 377.700-05 (1975). 
102 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 484(c) (1973). [d. § 490 states: 
The travel information council shall regulate the size, shape, color, lighting, manner of 
display and lettering of official business directional signs. Distinctive signs shall be estab-
lished to the extent considered practicable by the council for each type of service or 
facility, different from those for other types; and appropriate signs shall be provided for 
each eligible applicant within a given category. The travel information council is made 
up of seven members representating the secretary of state, the restaurant industry, the 
recreation industry, the lodging industry, the Department of Highways, the Department 
of Agriculture and the Scenery Preservation Council. 
103 The travel information council is created to make rules consistent with the statute on 
all matters including sign location. "In making those rules it shall consult with the scenery 
preservation council as to preservation of scenic and aesthetic values .... " [d. § 484(bl. 
104 [d. § 481(2). 
'0' [d. § 489. 
.. 
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particular site they are located at sign plazas adjacent to the road-
way where vehicles may stop to inspect them.108 Only four signs per 
business are licensed and only one of the signs may be visible to 
traffic moving in anyone direction, unless hardship would result. 107 
In locating these signs, considerations of safety, convenience,and 
aesthetics are of foremost importance. lOS 
The Vermont statute exempts a few of the same types of signs as 
the Hawaii statute. 109 It further exempts signs advertising county 
fairs;t1o signs away from highways advertising church and civic 
meetings; 111 and directional signs no larger than four square feet 
giving directions to farms selling produce to the public. 112 
Broad state regulation of on-premise signs also has been achieved 
in Vermont.tt3 The Vermont statute limits on-premise sign area to 
one hundred fifty square feet,114 and sign height to twenty-five feet 
above ground level and ten feet above roof level. 115 The figures used 
by Vermont are the legislature's best estimate of local community 
standards of aesthetics. 
Neither the Hawaii nor the Vermont legislation has yet been chal-
lenged by private outdoor advertising interests. According to a 
spokesman for the Agency of Environmental Conservation in Ver-
mont, implementation of the legislation there has proceeded 
smoothly and without significant protest. 118 
More statewide regulation of outdoor advertising is needed, but 
a slightly different approach than that taken in Hawaii or Vermont 
might be more effective. Both of these statutes have the effect of 
unnecessarily eliminating outdoor advertising in areas purely com-
mercial while concurrently allowing some inequitable exceptions to 
necessary aesthetic protections. The exceptions, especially those in 
'''8 [d. § 490. 
1111 [d. § 491. 
I., [d. § 492. 
to' [d. § 494(1),(2),(7). 
1111 [d. § 494(11). 
III [d. § 494(4). 
112 [d. § 494(12). 
113 [d. § 493. 
'" [d. § 493(1). Note that square footage requirements alone fail to ensure aethetic goals 
and can lead to discrimination. See note 85 and accompanying text, supra. 
115 [d. § 493(2). 
118 Similar bills are presently pending before the New York and Pennsylvania legislatures. 
In these two states, programs are reportedly being tried on an experimental basis. Conversa-
tion with spokesman for the Agency of Environmental Conservation, Vt. (Feb. 1977). 
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Hawaii, seem arbitrary. For example, the size of some signs of ex-
cepted content is unlimited; however, although the excepted con-
tent may warant a small sign, it may not merit a billboard. Permit-
ted political campaign signs and government information signs atop 
public buildings are as aesthetically offensive as commercial signs. 
Such distinctions under an aesthetically based statute should not 
be drawn. The interest in an aesthetically pleasing environment 
should outweigh any competing governmental interest in allowing 
nonemergency messages on billboards. Political and cultural mes-
sages, like commercial, may be communicated by alternative, less 
visually damaging channels. Unfortunately the Hawaii and Ver-
mont legislatures applied public interest distinctions reminiscent of 
those made in Bigelow v. Virginia.117 
State statutes offer many advantages over local ordinances. 
Statewide legislation, by setting forth clearly defined standards for 
communities and the outdoor advertising industry to follow, could 
decrease the amount of litigation fostered by the enactment of di-
verse local regulations and increase the possibility of regulation 
founded on altruism rather than on special interest influence. The 
problems of ineffective local enforcement occasioned by the apathy 
of local officials or the policies of overly liberal variance-granting 
can be avoided. Above all, statewide regulation would ensure all 
communities the right to an aesthetically pleasing and natural envi-
ronment free from unnecessary eyesores. To regulate on-premise 
signs in a way affording at least minimum protection requires state 
action, while at the same time allowing more stringent home rule 
regulation if the local communities so desire. This might be accom-
plished by a state licensing procedure geared to enforce compliance 
with state regulations. 
The following guidelines for statewide regulation of outdoor ad-
vertising are suggested as more equitable and effective in reflecting 
proper community standards of aesthetics: 
(1) All outdoor off-premise advertising displays are prohibited 
in any zoning district where not more than fifty percent of the 
district is commercial or industrial, determined by the number 
and type of district dwellings. liS 
117 421 U.S. 809 (1975). First Amendment protection was given to commercial abortion 
referral ads because they were deemed to be in the "public interest." See notes 66-67, and 
accompanying text, supra. 
'" In areas more than fifty percent commercial, private residents' rights would be out-
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(2) No permitted off-premise outdoor advertising display in a 
commercial, nonresidential zone as determined in (1) shall be 
larger than poster board (12'3" by 24'6") size.1I8 
(3) No permitted off-premise outdoor advertising display in a 
commercial, nonresidential zone as determined in (1) shall be 
plainly visible from another district which is not commercial, 
nonresidential. 120 
(4) All outdoor advertising displays adjacent to or visible from 
any public park or recreational area shall be prohibited. 121 
(5) The following off-premise signs are exempt from the require-
ments of this chapter: 
(a) Official notices and signs, posted by court order or by 
order of any public officer in the performance of his duty when 
such notice cannot be communicated effectively by other 
means. 122 
(b) Any outdoor advertising device carried by persons or 
placed upon vehicles used for the transportation of persons and 
goods,123 
(c) Any outdoor advertising device warning the public of dan-
gerous conditions near where that condition exists. 124 
(d) All official traffic control and directional signs. 
The remainder of the statute should parallel Vermont's by estab-
lishing a state authority to provide for business directional signs, 
sign plazas, and visitor information centers along its highways. The 
weighed by a governmental interest in promoting commerce. See text at notes 2, 60, supra, 
and quote at note 51, supra. 
11. Figures are used merely as illustration. OR. REv. STAT. § 377.745 (1975) reads in part: 
"Limitations on form and size of signs. (1) An outdoor advertising sign shall not exceed (a) a 
length of 48 feet; (b) a height, excluding foundation and supports, of 14 feet; or (c) a sign 
area of 825 square feet." Spacing of signs allowed in a commercial, nonresidential district 
need not be regulated because outdoor advertising is ineffective if cluttered amongst compet-
ing signs. Interview with William McBain, Counsel for John Donnelly & Sons, Inc., in Boston, 
Mass. (Nov. 26, 1976). 
120 The purpose of the statute, which is to prevent visual pollution in districts where outdoor 
displays are inappropriate, would otherwise be thwarted. Vermont businesses maintaining 
signs in New Hampshire visible only from Vermont which would be illegal if erected in 
Vermont, violate the Vermont statute. OP. VT. ATT'y GEN. 126 (1972). 
121 Many public parks are located amidst commercial districts, e.g., the Boston Common 
in Boston, Mass. 
122 Cf. HAW. REv. STAT., § 445-112(1) (1968). 
IZ3 See id. § 445-112(7). The intrusion on privacy and the damage to the aesthetic welfare 
is most significant in the case of stationary outdoor advertising signs. 
124 See id. § 445-112(8). The interest of public safety should be paramount to any other 
governmental intest. 
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legislation should be enforced by requiring state licensure of bill-
boards granted upon receipt of a certificate of compliance with the 
chapter. Such a method of enforcement would be more effective 
than depending upon the initiative and budgets of public officials 
and private individuals to seek injunctive relief as in Hawaii. '25 
More regulations concerning public safety requirements could also 
be added to the statute. Such regulations would include location, 
construction, maintenance, and lighting requirements for permitted 
signs. 
CONCLUSION 
The courts have enunciated the right to live in an aesthetically 
pleasing environment as well as the state's right to use its police 
powers to preserve the environment. Aesthetics is recognized as a 
valid police power objective and is considered important enough to 
outweigh even First Amendment liberties infringed by outdoor ad-
vertising regulations. The public aesthetic welfare is affected by 
intrusive signs, regardless of their type. 
The determination of what is aesthetically acceptable is best left 
to community standards incorporated into the laws by our elected 
representatives. In their evaluation of public aesthetic ideals, they 
must bear in mind the needs of residential and purely commercial 
environments, preserving what is essential to each locale, and con-
trolling the balance of commercial and residential interests. It is 
their duty to provide for the general welfare, and their enactments 
should guarantee all communities the minimum of protection they 
need from garish on-premise and ill-placed off-premise signs. Hope-
fully, the states will adopt legislation similar to that suggested in 
this article and thereby achieve a controlled environment in which 
all communities enjoy horizons visually acceptable to their citizens. 
125 See id. § 445-120. 
